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Abstract 
This article evaluates the reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, set within 
the context of negotiations about the Multi-annual Framework for 2014-20. It traces 
the reform process from the proposals presented by the Commission in 2010 – 
encapsulated as ‘convergence, capping and greening’ – to the outcomes 
eventually agreed in 2013 after inter-institutional bargaining. The conclusion is that 
the reform outcomes highlight that the CAP remains resistant to substantial 
change, both in terms of its budget and in its main policy instruments. This 
incremental change is explained in institutional terms. First, the balance of 
institutional forces within the EU, especially the member states and the continuing 
power of the agricultural interest, still works to insulate the CAP against pressures 
for radical reform. There is a continuing cleavage between advocates of substantial 
change and a much larger bloc of member states who favour the retention of the 
‘traditional’ CAP. Second, the new institutional setting of co-decision, which 
increased the role and influence of the EP, reinforced the dominant ‘state-assisted’ 
conception of agricultural policy.  
JEL classification 
Q18; H230 
Keywords 
Agricultural Policy, CAP reform, Multi-annual Financial Framework, co-decision 
European Journal of Government and Economics 2(2) 
 
120
Introduction 
Agriculture has always provided a fertile field for students of politics and public 
policy, especially those of us fascinated by how the political power of farmers in 
Europe has persisted despite the long gradual decline in their number and the 
relative economic importance of the sector. This is reflected in the fact that the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) not only has received the lion’s share of EU 
level spending over the years, but that it continues to do so. The durability of the 
CAP and farm spending in the face of pressures for its substantial reduction, and 
the fact that it continues to be important for many member states, gives a highly 
political edge to debates about its reform. It is partly for these reasons – the size of 
the farm budget and the relative resistance to change of the CAP - that the 
agriculture sector is of interest for scholars of the EU as well as those seeking to 
explain the durability of public policies generally.  
Much of the academic literature on the CAP and comparative agricultural policy 
generally has tended to emphasise its ‘exceptional’ nature and its relative 
resistance to change, underpinned by an institutional balance of forces that favours 
the agricultural interest, both in respect of national governments and societal 
groups representing producers (see for example Coleman et al 1997, Grant 1997, 
Rieger 2000, Roederer-Rynning 2010, Skogstad 1998). Of course this does not 
mean that change is impossible, and over the long term, incremental change can 
have substantial cumulative effects. Rather what is at issue is the speed, extent 
and direction of change. Burrell (2009) charts a pattern of continuous reform of the 
CAP, from a highly centralized protectionist policy focused on farm incomes to one 
that is more market sensitive and environmentally sustainable, and in which 
governments have greater scope to adapt the overall framework to their particular 
national conditions (see also Greer 2005). However it would be a mistake to see 
policy change as a historically driven one-way process. Daugbjerg (2009), for 
example, uses the notion of ‘sequencing’ to show how changes to the CAP over 
time are often reactive but not necessarily in the same direction and that each 
reform event opens possibilities for further reform.   
CAP reform episodes since the late 1980s – such as the MacSharry reforms in 
1992, the Agenda 2000 reforms in 1999 and the Fischler package in 2003 - have 
provided insightful case studies of the speed and scale of change, the endogenous 
institutional forces at play, and importance of exogenous factors such as 
enlargement and world trade liberalisation (see Ackrill 2000a, Cunha 2011, Keeler 
1996, Swinbank 1999, and Swinnen 2009). Typically CAP reform outcomes are 
viewed as incremental change, the outcome of bargaining between actors in which 
the key factors are the preferences and institutional structures of member states, 
with the Commission also playing a crucial role in setting the reform agenda.  
Reflecting the wider contemporary interest in the role of ideas in the policy process, 
some authors emphasise the link between the changing ideational context and the 
shape of reform outcomes (Lynggaard and Nedergaard (2009). Also drawing on 
the importance of policy ideas, Daugbjerg  and Swinbank (2009) point to the 
importance of trade agreements, notably the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), in the development of the CAP, especially in establishing the 
market liberal paradigm as the ideational underpinning of agricultural trade. Yet 
they still caution that this sits awkwardly with the continued dominance of the state-
assisted paradigm as the foundation of the CAP. Erjavec et al (2008) also have 
noted how the policy discourse of Agriculture Commissioners (Fischler and 
Fischer-Boel) exhibited a rhetorical shift from a largely mercantilist to a neo-liberal 
perspective. Subsequently, however, some have argued that the tenure of 
Commissioner Cioloş has witnessed something of a reversal back to the state-
assisted position that defended farm subsidies as a way to ensure a fair and 
efficient European agriculture (Rutz et al, forthcoming).       
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Budgetary considerations have played a key role in agricultural policy change, 
sometimes bringing the issue onto the policy agenda and opening a policy window 
for CAP reform, for example the crisis of over-production in the 1980s. Ackrill 
(2000b) has argued that EU budgetary rules and expenditure limits can work to 
constrain CAP reform. In addition, he uses ideas about historical institutionalism 
and path-dependence to explore the linkages between institutional reform of the 
budget and change in the CAP, especially in the period 1988-92. While these 
concepts are ideally suited to explain the resilience of agricultural policy, they need 
to be joined with the notion of ‘institutional layering’ to explain the how largely path-
dependent processes can experience reform (Ackrill and Kay 2006a).    
This relationship can be seen clearly in the negotiations on the multi-annual 
financial framework (MFF) for 2014-20, and a parallel round of CAP reform, both of 
which concluded in 2013. In the MFF case, debates about the overall level of the 
EU budget, and of the place of agriculture within it, were centre-stage, framed by 
the context of economic austerity. On CAP reform the core questions concerned 
how best to reshape the policy to meet contemporary concerns, for example about 
fair treatment for all member states and the deepening of environmental 
sustainability, related crucially to the overall budgetary envelope. A crucial factor 
that influenced both process and outcomes was the changed institutional setting. 
As well as the contemporaneous discussions on the budget, the CAP reform 
debates took place within the new institutional arrangements introduced in the 
Lisbon Treaty, which extended the co-decision procedure to the CAP and arguably 
has enhanced the influence of the European Parliament (EP). Indeed the 2013 
CAP reform dossiers were the first major test of these new institutional 
arrangements.  
After first summarising the budgetary context and the historical trends on the 
funding of the CAP, this article sets out the outcomes of the MFF for 2014-20, 
highlighting changes in the proposed allocations during the negotiations. It then 
traces the CAP reform process between 2010 and 2013 in light of the initial 
proposals presented by the Commission. It concludes that the outcomes of the 
reform process were less radical than originally envisaged. This relative path-
dependence and incremental change is explained in institutional terms. First, the 
balance of institutional forces within the EU, most especially the policy preferences 
of the main policy actors – especially the member states and the continuing power 
of the agricultural interest - still works to insulate the CAP against pressures for 
radical reform. There is a continuing cleavage between member states, which 
maps onto a broader budgetary gainers/losers division, between advocates of 
radical reform and those who favour the retention of the ‘traditional’ CAP. Second, 
the new institutional setting of co-decision, which increased the role and influence 
of the EP, reinforced the ‘traditional’ conception of the purpose and shape of 
agricultural policy. The central conclusion is that the outcomes of the reform 
processes highlight that the CAP still remains resistant to substantial change, both 
in terms of the level and distribution of its budget, and in its main policy 
mechanisms and instruments, despite demands from some quarters for a radical 
reconfiguration of policy to take a more focused ‘public goods’ approach. 
CAP spending in historical perspective 
Agriculture has always consumed a big slice of the EU budget, reflecting that the 
CAP historically has been the most important ‘common’ policy. In the late 1970s 
around 75 per cent of total spending went to agriculture but since then the 
trajectory has been downwards. By the first year of the 1988-92 financial period the 
CAP still took up 60 per cent of spending, despite reforms to the budget that made 
it ‘redistributive and less CAP-oriented’ (Laffan and Lindner 2010, p. 217). By the 
late 1990s farm expenditure fell to around half, reflecting successive reforms to the 
CAP and the expansion of the EU into areas such as cohesion, regional and social 
policy. By the late 2000s the CAP budget (now including rural development) still 
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represented around 40 per cent of the total but is projected to continue on a 
gradual downwards trajectory (for a fuller discussion see Greer 2012). 
Annual budgets for agriculture and rural development are set within the overall 
framework of the EU’s multi annual financial frameworks. In the MFF for 2007-13, 
around 43 per cent of a total €976bn went to the ‘preservation and management of 
natural resources’, mainly the CAP.  Although total spending did not fall by much 
over the MFF, the agriculture budget continued its relative decline because of the 
expansion of competences and increased expenditure in other areas. By the final 
year of the MFF in 2013 the proportion of the EU budget devoted to the CAP had 
fallen to around 40 per cent (€60bn) (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: EU budget 2013 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2013/2013_en.cfm 
The distribution of these substantial resources for agriculture and rural 
development has always been a matter of contention, especially around spending 
on environmental sustainability. In the 2007-13 MFF one third of the total budget 
(around 80 per cent of CAP spending) went to ‘traditional’ direct payments and 
market intervention in agriculture (pillar 1) while the remainder was for measures 
on the environment and rural development (pillar 2). To use the Commission’s 
somewhat misleading language, by 2013 ‘agricultural’ spending had declined to 
around 30 per cent of the total budget, although this is something of an 
‘accountancy trick’ because almost all of pillar 2 expenditure goes to farmers and 
landowners under the auspices of the CAP. So despite a falling share, spending on 
the CAP remains substantial. As the Commission acknowledged, ‘agriculture is, in 
budgetary terms, the second most important Union policy, and the only fully 
integrated policy at Union level’ (EU Commission 2011b).   
The Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020 
Discussions about CAP reform took place in tandem with negotiations about the 
MFF for 2014-20, both framed by financial crisis and the ‘austerity agenda’. The 
draft MFF unveiled by the Commission in June 2011 envisaged spending of €1025 
billion, an increase of nearly five per cent. Following difficult negotiations, in 
February 2013 the European Council agreed an MFF that was widely referred to as 
the first ever budget ‘cut’ in the history of the EU (although previous MFF saw ‘cuts’ 
in terms of percentage gross national income (GNI)(see Benedetto and Milio 2012, 
p. 180). Inter-institutional negotiations between the EP, Council and Commission 
produced a compromise political agreement in June 2013. Table 2 illustrates the 
proposals and outcomes of the negotiations at various stages prior to the final 
inter-institutional agreement. An overall ceiling of €960bn (commitment 
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appropriations) was agreed, a reduction of around three per cent in 2011 prices 
over previous period and of eight per cent on the Commission’s proposals.   
Explanations of the outcomes of budget negotiations usually emphasise the 
relative influence of core actors and institutions at both the supranational and 
national levels. For Laffan and Lindner (2010) the European Council ‘is the 
dominant player’, with the Commission trying to play the role of ‘honest broker’ 
(2010, pp. 213-4). As Swidlicki et al. also note the EU budget has proved difficult to 
reform ‘because it is not primarily designed to maximise economic returns across 
Europe, but rather to balance a range of political interests. Member states are keen 
to protect areas of the budget from which they do well...’ (2012, p. 6). A usual 
approach is to classify member states in terms of whether they are ‘net 
contributors’ (countries who pay out more than they get back such as the UK, 
Sweden, Finland and Germany) or ‘net beneficiaries’ (such as Greece and 
Portugal) in terms of the EU and CAP budget (with sometimes a third category of 
countries who pay in more or less as much as they receive (including Belgium, 
Denmark, France and Italy)(see de Wilde 2012, p. 1081; Swidlicki et al 2012, pp. 7-
9).    
On the 2014-2020 MFF, the net contributors resisted a budget increase, 
highlighted in a letter to Commission President Barroso in December 2010 in which 
David Cameron, Angela Merkel and other leaders argued that EU spending ‘cannot 
be exempt from the considerable efforts made by the Member States to bring their 
public spending under control.’ Specifically the next MFF ‘should not exceed the 
2013 level with a growth rate below the rate of inflation’ (Cameron et al. 2010).  
Table 2. MFF 2014-2020: comparisons (€m) 
Commitment appropriations 
In million euros (2011 prices) 
MFF 2007- 
2013 
MFF 2014-
2020 
Commission 
proposal June 
2012 
MFF 2014-
2020 
European 
Council 
conclusions 
08.02.2013 
European 
Council 
conclusions  
vs  
MFF 2007-2013 
European 
Council 
Conclusions 
vs 
Commission 
Proposals 
    million euros (%) million euros (%) 
Total commitment 
appropriations 
994.176 1.045.282 959.988 -34.188 (-3%) -85.294 (-8%) 
as a percentage of GNI 1,12% 1,09% 1,00% -0,12% -0,09% 
1. Sustainable Growth 446.310 503.310 450.763 +4.453 (+1%) -52.547 (-10%) 
1a. Competitiveness for 
Growth and Jobs 
91.495 164.316 125.614 +34.119 (+37%) -38.702 (-24%) 
of which: Connecting Europe 
Facility 
12.783 40.249 19.299 +6.516 (+51%) -20.950 (-52%) 
of which: Galileo, ITER and 
GMES 
8.047 15.548 12.793 +4.746 (+59%) -2.755 (-18%) 
1b. Cohesion for Growth and 
Employment 
354.815 338.994 325.149 -29.666 (-8%) -13.845 (-4%) 
of which: Investment for 
growth and jobs 
345.935 327.116 313.197 -32.738 (-9%) -13.919 (-4%) 
of which: European territorial 
cooperation 
8.880 11.878 8.948 68 (+1%) -2.930 (-25%) 
      
2. Preservation and 
Management of Natural 
Resources 
420.682 389.972 373.179 -47.503 (-11%) -16.793 (-4%) 
of which: market related 
expenditure and direct 
payments 
318.820 286.551 277.851 -40.969 (-13%) -8.700 (-3%) 
of which: rural development 95.741 91.966 84.936 -10.805 (-11%) -7.030 (-8%) 
3. Citizenship, freedom, 
security and justice 
12.366 18.809 15.686 +3.320 (+27%) -3.123 (-17%) 
4. EU as a global player  56.815 70.000 58.704 +1.889 (+3%) -11.296 (-16%) 
5. Administration 57.082 63.165 61.629 +4.547 (+8%) -1.536 (-2%) 
      
6. Compensations 920 27 27 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/index_en.cfm 
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Negotiations between the member states on the MFF reflected core national 
interests and revolved around established issues such as the UK ‘rebate’ and the 
level of funding for the CAP. Here the relationship between the UK and France is 
again instructive. With the government under pressure from a  sizeable number of 
euro-sceptic Conservative MPs, the UK wanted at least a freeze, if not a 
substantial cut, in the total MFF but also to defend its ‘rebate’ (see House of 
Commons Library 2013, p. 7). Although outgoing President Sarkozy (but not 
President François Hollande) at times supported a freeze in spending, he 
disagreed with the UK on the extent of ‘cuts’ and in the areas they should fall. 
While there were suggestions that Cameron and Sarkozy had agreed informally 
that the UK would not push too hard for CAP reform if France did not demand cuts 
in the rebate (The Guardian, 28 May 2012), Hollande questioned the justification 
for the British rebate and brought Italy and Spain into a troika of ‘refuseniks’ in an 
effort to fend off a substantial reduction in the MFF and to protect agricultural 
spending.  
Overall the consensus of opinion favoured budgetary constraint, although there 
was disagreement about the scale of ‘cuts’. The pivotal role was played by German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel who came down in favour of a squeeze on spending. For 
one commentator, the negotiations created ‘an impression of earnest endeavour 
that paved the way for a victory for the austerity agenda of David Cameron and 
Angela Merkel’ (Wyles 2013). Certainly the British government presented the MFF 
outcome as a major diplomatic triumph, both in terms of protecting the rebate and 
securing a cut in the budget – what Cameron referred to as ‘Europe's seven-year 
credit card limit’ (although it was also acknowledged that the UK’s net contributions 
will still rise because the rebate does not cover increased spending in new member 
states).  
CAP Reform and the MFF 2014-2020 
Reaching agreement on the MFF is only the beginning of the story. Perhaps more 
important are the debates about how a smaller cake is to be divided up, whether 
between countries or sectors,  
The CAP after 2013: the MFF context 
Debates about CAP reform after 2013 took place within the context of the 
negotiations on the draft MFF. This was something of a departure on previous 
experience because reforms of the CAP have tended to take place ‘outside the 
framework of the big budget bargains’ (Laffan and Lindner 2010, p. 224). 
Agriculture spending for 2007-13, for example, was fixed by the Chirac-Shroeder 
deal in 2002 and independently of the main MFF negotiations on the MFF (see 
Greer 2012, p. 106). During the debate on the MFF, some reformist voices 
advocated a radical shift of the EU’s budgetary priorities to fund increased 
spending on sustainable growth in areas such as employment, 
research/development and energy, rooted in a conviction that most CAP spending 
does not promote the attainment of public goods (Greer 2012, pp. 111-2). One 
proposal advocated a switch in funding from the CAP to better targeted spending 
on issues such as energy and climate change (Núñez Ferrer, 2009). A complete 
and radical overhaul of the EU also was recommended in a report by the relatively 
Euro-sceptic Open Europe, whose ‘alternative budget’ proposed a reduction of 
spending by almost a third while focusing the smaller budget that remained ‘far 
more effectively on boosting jobs and growth’ (Swidlicki et al, 2012, p. 3).  
Yet arguably the agreement on the MFF changed little despite the rhetoric and 
reality of cuts. For one commentator the negotiations produced a budget 
agreement ‘that helps farmers but will do little to create growth and jobs’ (Wyles 
2013). Certainly the distribution of ‘cuts’ in relation to the Commission’s original 
proposals fell heavily on areas such as ‘citizenship’ (17 per cent), the ‘EU as a 
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global player’ (16 per cent) and crucially proposed expenditure on ‘sustainable 
growth’ was reduced by 10 per cent (€50m) on the proposals, with the 
‘competitiveness for growth and jobs’ heading reduced by 24 per cent (€38m), and 
funds for the ‘connecting Europe’ facility within this slashed by over half, although 
on this still represented increases on the previous MFF.  
That a radical reconfiguration of the budget away from the CAP was unlikely had 
been evident from the Commission’s draft MFF which explicitly acknowledged that 
‘a significant part of the EU budget should continue to be dedicated to agriculture, 
which is a common policy of strategic importance’, and that the CAP share of 
funding be maintained at the 2013 level (2011c, p. 7). Nevertheless the actual 
resources available for the CAP will be reduced. In the initial proposals €379bn 
was earmarked for the CAP (37 per cent of the total), compared with €415bn in the 
previous MFF. After the Council agreement, this figure was adjusted marginally 
downwards to €363bn, representing a reduction of around 12 per cent on the 
previous MFF, and an extra cut of 4-5 per cent on the Commission proposals (see 
table 2). There will be real reductions in agricultural spending, which will go down in 
real terms and also as a percentage of the total budget (predicted to fall to around 
37 per cent by 2020). While consistent with the pattern of continued gradual 
decline, however, this does not represent the fundamental restructuring EU 
spending and its core priorities that the radical reformers have argued for.  
Within this overall context, a the MFF agreement broadly maintains the 75:25 
spending ratio between pillar 1 direct payments/market measures and pillar 2 rural 
development/environmental sustainability. The Commission proposal earmarked 
76 per cent to direct payments and 24 per cent to rural development; in the Council 
conclusions these figures were roughly maintained although the reduction for rural 
development was eight per cent compared with four per cent in direct payments. 
Expressed in current prices, proposed annual expenditure from 2014 is stable, 
although commitment appropriations on market support and direct payments will 
still make up 30 per cent of the EU budget in 2014 and 27 per cent in 2020 (see 
table 3).   
Table 3. MFF 2014-2020: commitment appropriations (€m) 
 
Source: House of Commons Library 2013, p. 9. 
CAP Reform after 2013: the proposals 
Between April 2010 (when it initiated preliminary discussions) and October 2011 
(the publication of detailed legislative proposals), the EU Commission’s Directorate 
General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG Agri) formulated proposals for 
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a reformed CAP after 2013. The aim was to take the opportunity provided by the 
new MFF to ‘refocus the CAP on its core and new activities’ (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 15). Resources would be better targeted with a ‘greener 
and more equitably distributed first pillar’ with a second pillar ‘more focussed on 
competitiveness and innovation, climate change and the environment’ (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 16). The goal is to promote a ‘new partnership between 
Europe and its farmers’ through creating a CAP that will ‘strengthen the 
competitiveness, sustainability and permanence of agriculture throughout the EU in 
order to secure for European citizens a healthy and high-quality source of food, 
preserve the environment and develop rural areas’ (Europa, 2011). 
Based on the belief that there remained widespread support for a strong CAP 
structured around its two pillars, DG Agri set out three broad policy scenarios that 
struck different balances between them. An ‘adjustment scenario’ envisaged 
‘further gradual changes’, while a ‘refocusing scenario’ would usher in far reaching 
reform, with a substantially reduced budget centred on environmental and climate 
change objectives. For the Commission however, the first option would not 
adequately address the challenges of the future, whereas the second would ‘come 
at a significant social and environmental cost’ (European Commission, 2011c, pp. 
5-6; 2011d, p. 38; 2010a, p. 12). Consequently the preferred approach was a 
midpoint ‘integration scenario’ that would ‘make major overhauls of the policy in 
order to ensure that it becomes more sustainable, and that the balance between 
different policy objectives, farmers and Member States is better met’ (European 
Commission, 2010a, p. 12 original emphasis). As fleshed out in policy specifics in 
the Commission’s legislative proposals, this approach has three main elements 
that are intended to alter the distribution of spending within the CAP: convergence, 
capping, and greening (see Swinbank 2012).  
‘Convergence’ aimed to promote fairness by progressively narrowing variations in 
direct payments between farmers and across countries, particularly between old 
and ‘new’ Europe, to ensure both ‘a more equal distribution of direct support’ and 
‘fairer treatment of farmers performing the same activities’ (European Commission, 
2011a, p. 16). A unified ‘basic payment scheme’ would be phased in and replace 
the existing plethora of systems by 2019. National envelopes for direct payments 
will be adjusted so that countries receiving less than 90 per cent of the EU average 
payment will see one third of the gap closed.  
‘Capping’ proposed the progressive reduction of payments received by large 
beneficiaries and holdings, with resources transferred to rural development 
(sometimes referred to as degressivity). Reductions would start at 20 per cent for 
entitlements between €150,000 and €200,000, gradually increasing in three stages 
to a 100 per cent reduction for payments over €300,000. 
‘Greening’ was to be substantially enhanced by making 30 per cent of direct 
support (pillar 1) conditional on verifiable and legally defined ‘environmentally 
supportive practices’ with farmers ‘receiving payments to deliver public goods to 
their fellow citizens’ (European Commission, 2011a, p. 16). These practices were 
to include practices such as crop diversification, maintenance of permanent 
pasture, and the preservation of ecological reserves and landscapes. Countries 
would be able to transfer up to five per cent of direct payments between pillars to 
reinforce rural development, although for those whose level of direct payments is 
below 90 per cent of the EU average, ‘reverse’ transfer to pillar 1 will be allowed.   
The CAP after 2013: explaining the outcomes 
For Laffan and Lindner, the three financial perspectives since early 1990s did little 
more than facilitate incremental changes in the levels of spending on the CAP 
(2010, p. 218). While farm spending will go down, analysis of the MFF for 2014-
2020 supports this picture, with agriculture still accounting for over one third of the 
total EU budget. Two main ideas usually are offered to explain this: the relative 
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balance of influence between member states as reflected in the outcomes of 
bargaining, and the nature of inter-institutional governance in the EU, both of which 
are overlaid by an enduring structural power enjoyed by agricultural interests. 
Because the CAP still takes up over a third of the budget, there is an overlap 
between ‘net recipient’ countries and a bloc of ‘CAP defenders’, which Swidlicki et 
al estimate at 24 countries. Although probably an over-exaggeration, around 20 
countries defended the CAP at an Agriculture Council meeting in March 2011, 
greeted by French agriculture minister, Bruno Le Maire, as not just a ‘strong 
political signal of support by governments for the CAP’ but for ‘strengthening it in 
the years to come’ (Euractiv.com, 2 June 2010, 18 March 2011). Most member 
states generally favour maintaining CAP funding at around its current level, 
although they do differ about what the money should be spent on. For Swidlicki et 
al., this is ‘a powerful bloc which continues to block reform under the influence of 
the farm lobby, the Commission, and many MEPs’ (2012, p. 9).  
This draws attention to the importance of EU institutions such as the EP, which has 
a formal role on CAP under the Lisbon Treaty and which has tended to favour the 
maintenance of agricultural spending at around its current level (see Greer & Hind 
2012). The Agriculture Council – historically the key actor on the CAP - typically 
has been regarded as defending the interests of farmers. As Swidlicki et al. pithily 
summarise, ‘through the Commission’s agenda-setting powers and the 
Parliament’s veto powers, the EU institutions are also an obstacle to reforming the 
budget’ (2012, p. 9). This, however, understates the extent to which the 
Commission actually has at times been an influential actor in promoting CAP 
reform. 
National interests and preferences 
Negotiating outcomes on the CAP and MFF reflect compromise and bargaining 
between different national interests but fundamental disagreements between 
member states remain extremely important. As Agra Europe noted in a report on 
an informal meeting of agriculture ministers in Spain in June 2010, ‘calls for an end 
to Pillar One largesse were echoed by more liberal-leaning member states…while 
traditional defenders of the CAP budget made clear their continued support for a 
strong CAP despite the new budgetary austerity sweeping across Europe’ (No. 
2415, 4 June 2010).  
Traditional CAP defenders such as France, Ireland and Greece support 
maintenance of the farm budget, favour direct payments tied to past levels of 
production, and remain sceptical about ‘greening’. In early 2011, for example, 
President Sarkozy made it clear that France aimed to ‘maintain the CAP's budget 
to the last euro’ and stated that ‘we do not have to excuse ourselves for defending 
Community preference and the CAP budget’ (Euractiv.com, 19 January 2011; Le 
Monde.Fr, 12 May 2011). A crucial element in the political process on CAP reform, 
as it was in 2002, was the Franco-German axis. In a joint paper in September 2010 
they set out agreed core principles for ‘a strong CAP beyond 2013’, rejected any 
‘renationalization’, supported retention of the two pillar structure and of direct 
payments, and opposed substantial redistributive measures towards convergence’ 
(Bundesministerium et al, 2010, p. 2). This was reinforced by a joint communique 
issued after a meeting in Berlin in October 2012 by agriculture ministers, Ilse 
Aigner and Stéphane Le Foll, which rejected calls from Britain, Poland and others 
for substantial cuts in pillar 1 expenditure. Both ministers also stressed the need to 
maintain ‘close and trustful relations during the final stages of negotiations over 
CAP reform and the MFF’ (Euractiv.com, 11 October 2012). France also joined 
with Spain in defence of farm spending. In February 2012 their agriculture ministers 
issued a statement that stressed the importance of maintaining a strong agricultural 
sector and made clear they would ‘not accept’ any budget that ‘does not guarantee 
the stabilisation of the CAP’ or maintain the existing level of spending 
(Euractiv.com, 15 February 2012). 
European Journal of Government and Economics 2(2) 
 
128
Reflecting their general stance on the MFF, pro-reform countries such as the UK, 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands outlined radical reform ideas that were 
predicated to a degree on budgetary restraint. Recognising that substantial cuts in 
the short term were unlikely, they pressed for a substantial reorientation of support 
from pillar I (direct payments) to funding for the provision of public goods under 
pillar 2 in relation to rural development, the environment and climate change. In 
September 2011 for example, the agriculture ministers of the UK and Poland called 
for ‘deep and genuine’ reform of the CAP, centred on a more competitive 
agriculture sector and better incentives to improve the environment, with reduced 
emphasis on Pillar 1, convergence of direct payment rates, and a ‘step change’ in 
measures to increase competitiveness, including support under Pillar 2. This was 
described in one report as London and Warsaw putting themselves ‘firmly on a 
collision course with France’ over CAP reform (Euractiv.com, 22 October 2011). 
Preferences & outcomes 
The extent of the influence of the ‘reformers’ can be assessed by mapping the 
extent to which they were successful in translating policy preferences into 
outcomes, using the UK as an exemplar. The UK historically has been in the 
vanguard of those favouring radical reform of the CAP. While governments of all 
party complexions have not advocated the total abolition of the CAP, which they 
see as vital to free trade within an undistorted single market, they do want a much 
less expensive, more consumer friendly, and more market oriented agricultural 
policy that is better focused on core objectives such as competitiveness and the 
environment. This means that reform must be radical and extensive, phasing out 
direct income support payments and shifting emphasis to pillar 2 funded public 
goods in the overall context of a smaller agricultural budget that has greater co-
financing. Whether this would resemble anything like the CAP as we have come to 
know it is open to doubt. 
As the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) noted in 
its response to the Commission’s reform communication in January 2011, 
‘successive reforms of the CAP have set a direction of travel towards greater 
market orientation and agricultural competitiveness and a greater focus on the 
delivery of public benefits in return for CAP expenditure. The UK wants to see the 
acceleration of this process...’ (Defra 2011b: 1). For the UK the Commission’s 
proposals did not go far enough in two respects. First they insufficiently recognised 
the changed economic circumstances in the wake of the financial crisis. With 
intense pressure on public finances, the CAP ‘cannot be immune to the hard 
choices being made elsewhere in the EU’ and consequently there must be ‘a very 
substantial cut to the CAP Budget’ for the next MFF, concentrating on Pillar 1 and 
leaving pillar 2 with ‘a greater share of a smaller CAP budget’ (House of Commons, 
2011a, p. 5). Second, by not taking the radical re-focusing’ route the Commission 
proposals were ‘insufficiently ambitious for engendering the change in EU 
agriculture sector that will be needed if it is to survive in an increasingly competitive 
international agricultural market’ (House of Commons, 2011a, p. 4). Specifically the 
UK was concerned that proposals such as capping payments and greening Pillar 1 
‘would be counterproductive to EU aims to develop a competitive agriculture 
sector, and risk entrenching continued reliance on subsidies instead of 
independence.’ Rather there is ‘scope for Pillar 2 to better reward farmers for the 
important public goods they provide’ and that we ‘need to stimulate a change in 
behaviour rather than entrench continued reliance on subsidy which it is 
increasingly difficult for the European taxpayer to afford’ (Defra, 2011b: para. 7). 
The UK therefore argued strongly for phasing out of the remaining coupled 
subsidies, an end to export subsidies and market support measures such as 
intervention, and a radical reorientation of spending from pillar 1 to pillar 2, 
involving the gradual abolition of direct payments to reduce spending substantially.  
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So how does the outcome on CAP reform map onto such policy preferences? As 
one report put it, the CAP deal was finally reached on 26 June 2013 ‘after months 
of haggling over how ambitious the policy would be on overhauling direct 
payments, ending quotas, and making farmers more environmentally accountable’ 
(Euractiv.com, 11 July 2013). Key issues were the reform of direct payments and 
the pillar 2 budget, the abolition of market support measures, capping, 
convergence and the plans for ‘greening’ pillar 1.  
First, it is clear that advocates of radical reform did not succeed in obtaining the 
substantial reduction in the budget that they desired. Agriculture Council ministers 
broadly backed the Commission’s reform ideas, noting for example in March 2011 
that the CAP had to remain a strong common policy with financial resources 
commensurate with its objectives (Euractiv.com, 18 March 2011). The share of 
agriculture spending in the new MFF will still be around a third and will decrease 
only slowly. So a common reaction has been that ‘agriculture was spared from 
major cuts made elsewhere in the EU’s spending framework’ (Euractiv.com, June 
2013).  
Second, the 75:25 spending ratio between the pillars remains and will not change 
much, if all, by 2020. If anything, the Council conclusions on the MFF have resulted 
in a relatively greater reduction of planned spending on pillar 2 than in pillar 1. This 
indicates that when the budgetary circumstances are tight, governments and 
stakeholders resort to protecting their core interests (‘there are no votes in pillar 2’). 
Arguably ‘net contributors’ such as the UK prefer overall budgetary constraint to a 
reconfigured CAP, which might actually cost more in the short term. So while 
Cameron played up his ‘success’ on the MFF, this came at the expense of failure 
to move the CAP substantially in the British government’s favoured direction. 
Indeed on some calculations the MFF outcome has reduced the UK’s resources 
under pillar 2 by more than originally planned.     
Third, there was a mismatch on direct payments between the UK’s long-term vision 
for the CAP and its specific negotiating priorities. While the government argued that 
income support subsidies are neither desirable nor necessary, it ‘made it clear that 
phasing out such payments by 2020 is unrealistic, in both practical and negotiating 
terms’ (House of Commons, 2011a, p. 6). Instead the aim was for ‘a very 
substantial, transitional reduction followed by ultimate abolition at a later date’ 
(Defra, 2011b, para. 12). This chimed with the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee’s recommendation for ‘a more pragmatic approach’ because ending 
direct payments ‘is unachievable in the short-term’ and sticking rigidly to this policy 
‘reduces the UK’s ability to engage constructively with other Member States and 
could diminish the UK’s influence in this round of reform’ (2011b, p. 41). Essentially 
this recognises that while the UK does not like direct payments, most other 
countries do. In fact there are important voices in the UK who challenge the policy 
approach, which in many respects reflects a Treasury driven-agenda that is 
ideologically opposed to ‘subsidies’. The devolved adminstrations in Wales and 
Northern Ireland defend them, and stakeholders such as the National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU) are sceptical that they can be substantially reduced without having a 
substantial detrimental impact on the viability of many British farms. 
Fourth, the UK criticised the plans for ‘greening’ a substantial share of pillar 1 
funding as too modest but also fundamentally flawed, and ‘unlikely to deliver 
significantly greater or more ambitious environmental benefits than those that are 
currently delivered’ (Defra, 2011b, para. 27). The ‘greening’ proposals were the 
subject of much haggling during the negotiations on CAP reform, what one source 
has called the subject of ‘a high-pressure lobbying campaign’ from both farmers 
and environmentalists (Euractiv.com, July 2013). Other national governments 
expressed concerns that the policies would be burdensome. While the French and 
German agriculture ministers said that they supported ‘greening’, they nonetheless 
wanted a ‘flexible’ system so that ‘agriculturally sustainable use of areas of 
ecological interest may be possible’ (Euractiv.com, 11 October 2012). The 
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statement issued by France and Spain was even blunter, criticising the draft rules 
for ‘greening’ as ‘not adapted to the challenges facing European agriculture’ 
(Euractiv.com, 15 February 2012).  
In the negotiations, both the Council and MEPs supported plans to introduce 
‘greater flexibility’ into the farm subsidies system. This reflected some core 
concerns of farming stakeholder groups about ‘being locked into standardised 
environmental rules despite the diverse landscape of European agriculture’ 
(Euractiv.com July 2013). For others, including environmental groups, this meant 
watering down the proposed requirements for ‘greening’. One commentator noted 
in the wake of the Council conclusions on the MFF that Commission ‘is fighting a 
rearguard action to force farmers to work in a way that benefits the environment’, 
and that the scheme ‘was weakened as part of last week's grand bargain between 
EU leaders at their budget summit in Brussels’ (Harrabin 2013). A spokesperson 
for BirdLife Europe complained that ‘Europe is offered a budget that scales back 
investment in the environment and caters for the usual fat cats that have been 
milking the system until now’; for the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) ‘wildlife across Europe will pay a heavy price for this terribly regressive 
deal’ (as quoted in Harrabin 2013). 
Under the CAP deal, 30 per cent of direct payments will still be contingent on 
meeting certain environmental criteria, however there will be no EU-wide 
performance standards and member states will have greater flexibility in 
implementation, for example about when to apply sanctions. In addition the political 
agreement introduced a range of exceptions relating to water pollution, crop 
diversification and environmental sustainability. Farms under 15 hectares do not 
have to comply with new requirements to create “ecological focus areas,” which in 
the first instance will apply to five per cent of farmland in 2015, rather than the 
proposed seven per cent (this may still increase pending a review in 2017). For 
critics, more than one-third of all farmland and 89 per cent of farmers will be 
exempted from the rules. Farms of less than 10 hectares (one third of the total in 
the EU) are exempted from crop diversification rules aimed at improving soil 
quality, and farmers also remain outside some EU environmental and water 
pollution legislation. According to a spokesperson for BirdLife Europe this 
represented ‘a major blow to those who championed a more sustainable, forward-
thinking policy – one which would deliver for people and the environment as well as 
protecting the long-term interests of farming’ (Euractiv.com, July 2013).  
Fifth, capping direct payments, inspired by a desire to better support small farmers, 
also was an area of dispute. Similar proposals were fiercely resisted in previous 
reform episodes by countries such as the UK and France who have efficient and 
large scale enterprises. For DEFRA capping discourages greater competitiveness 
by restricting ‘natural structural processes’ such as amalgamation and 
consolidation (2011b, para. 23), and proposals for supporting small farms should 
concentrate on improving their underlying competitiveness. In the event the reform 
deal did stipulate that payments to those receiving more than €150,000 per year 
would be progressively reduced, but left unresolved the level of a limit on how 
much any farmer could receive. The new rules stipulate that each farmer receive at 
least 60 per cent of the average national or regional direct payment by 2019, a 
reshuffling that advocates say will help smaller landholders. Measures also were 
introduced to help ‘new entrant’ farmers. 
Sixth, some caveats were introduced around convergence and the forward march 
of ‘liberalisation’ was stalled in some respects, illustrating again the influence of the 
protectors of a traditional CAP. German, French and Spanish ministers had strong 
reservations about convergence, not least because any redistribution in favour of 
‘new’ member states would entail reduction in the benefits received by their own 
farmers (a Commission estimate put this as high as a 7 per cent reduction in 
funding for French farmers). France and Spain wanted a more careful phasing in of 
convergence and complained that the ‘magnitude’ and ‘pace’ proposed by the 
Greer ● The Common Agricultural Policy and the EU budget 
 
131
Commission was ‘not acceptable’. Nevertheless the CAP deal does provide for the 
gradual harmonisation of payments between old and new countries, requiring that 
no single state receives less than 75 per cent of the EU average by 2019.  
On the other hand the force of renewed arguments about food security in a world 
made increasingly volatile by climate change underpinned decisions to retain some 
production quotas. Although the last remaining export subsidies were reduced to 
zero, facilitated by high world food prices, sugar quotas were extended until 2017 
(two years later than their planned abolition) and a new vine planting scheme after 
2016 was introduced, rather than withdrawal of protection for grape growers. As 
Julie Girling, agriculture spokeswoman for the British Conservative party, 
complained, ‘old-fashioned market intervention is back in a big way, potentially 
taking us back to the bad old days of butter mountains and wine lakes’ 
(Euractiv.com, 11 July 2013). 
Constructing a balanced scorecard on all of these elements it seems clear that the 
result of the negotiations on CAP reform was to markedly water down the original 
proposals of the Commission in order to secure agreement between member 
states, each of whom had their own ‘red lines’ and negotiating objectives. In most 
respects this ‘watering down’ was at the expense of ideas such as ‘greening’ that 
are central to the proposals of the radical reformers, and consistent with objections 
raised by defenders of a ‘traditional’ CAP. One way this has been done is to 
continue the trend to give greater flexibility for member states and hence more 
scope for national variation (see Greer 2005). One analysis remarked that while the 
final agreement ‘retained some’ of the original goals, the inter-institutional 
negotiations produced an outcome that ‘gave the 28 member states more leeway, 
including over new environmental performance rules’ (Euractiv.com, 11 July 2013). 
This actually is consistent with the UK’s argument that member states  
should continue to be given the flexibility to allocate CAP funding in a way that best 
suits the requirements of their own regions and farming structures, providing it is 
consistent with the wider objectives of the CAP. A one-size fits all solution will 
restrict rather than facilitate, as well as adding significant complexity and costs 
(Defra, 2011b, para. 24). 
The CAP after 2013: the influence of co-decision 
The outcome of the CAP reform process can be explained in essentially traditional 
ways, mainly by focusing on the defence of important national interests by member 
states (acting on their own, bilaterally or in coalitions) usually under the continued 
influence of a domestic farm lobby. In addition the CAP deal (as with the MFF) 
embodies side payments and trade-offs between the main policy institutions and 
actors (for example increased budget rebates for the Netherlands and Austria, and 
extra rural development funding for several countries including Ireland). One new 
influence compared to previous CAP reform episodes was the part played by the 
EP, exercising the formal role given to it by the Lisbon Treaty. Although some 
relatively minor issues had already been processed using the new rules, the 2013 
CAP reform was the first real test of these new inter-institutional arrangements (see 
Greer & Hind, 2012).  
The first point to make is that co-decision in agriculture, at least on the big policy 
issues, is likely to prolong the policy process. The inter-institutional deal reached in 
June 2013 came nearly two years (21 months) after the Commission published its 
legislative proposals. As one report put it, there was a ‘slow decision-making 
process, highlighted by intense lobbying’, which means that much of the agreement 
will not be implemented until 2015, requiring the Commission to introduce 
transitional arrangements to cover 2014 (Euractiv.com, 11 July 2013).  
Second, as suggested in some early analyses of co-decision in agriculture, while 
the EP now has a greater formal role in the decision-making process, this – so far 
at least – has buttressed the status quo on the CAP rather than facilitate radical 
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change (Greer & Hind 2012). The EP’s agricultural committee, Comagri, dominated 
by farming, landowning and rural interests, defended the CAP in the negotiations 
and played a key part in altering the original proposals in some respects. The 
debates over ‘greening’ showed up the structural divisions within the EP, ‘leading 
to battles in Parliament between the more green-focused environmental committee 
and its agricultural counterpart’ (Euractiv.com, 11 July 2013). Irish agriculture 
minister, Simon Coveney, who oversaw the final stages of negotiations during 
Ireland’s EU Presidency, accepted that there had been ‘inter-institutional frictions’ 
but considered that ‘we have found a balance that everyone can agree with’. 
Others welcomed the broadening out of the decision process to a wider range of 
actors rather than a handful of national leaders. At the very least MEPs exercised 
their formal authority, ‘re-writing parts of the European Commission’s original 
farming proposal and working through 40 rounds of negotiations with national 
ministers and the Commission’. One French environmental campaigner even 
praised the inclusion of the EP as ‘good for food democracy…It’s not perfect, but it 
is better than in the past’ (Euractiv.com, July 2013). On the other hand, a more 
obvious interpretation is that offered by a spokesperson for WWF who complained 
that the EP  
has proven that it is not ready to handle its new full co-decision powers on the 
Common Agricultural Policy. At every turn the Agriculture Committee has tried to 
water down this reform.  It even managed to throw out the few improvements the 
Parliament plenary had requested of them. (Euractiv.com, July 2013). 
Conclusions 
The parallel negotiations on a new MFF for 2014-20 and proposals for the reform 
of the CAP after 2013 introduced greater complexity into the picture. It is arguable 
for example that the priorities of the UK focused more on big picture reductions (or 
a ‘freeze’) in overall budget expenditure rather than the specifics of CAP reform. In 
budgetary politics, radical reform is much harder under conditions of constraint, 
and in this case the tight agreement on the MFF made it even more difficult to 
secure radical changes in the CAP. So the window that might have opened for the 
MFF to usher in radical CAP reform stayed well shut. From the outset it was clear 
that the MFF process would not lead to a radical reconfiguration of the EUs budget 
priorities. Although real cuts were made in the resources allocated to agriculture, 
the CAP continues to be a substantial beneficiary from the EU budget. Within this 
framework, the balance between the two pillars will stay broadly the same, with no 
real transfer of funds from direct payments to measures for rural development and 
environmental sustainability. If anything, the outcome of the negotiations actually 
was to water down the original proposals for enhanced environmental measures, 
achieved in some part by reinforcing the capacity for national variation, and to row 
back from the liberalisation agenda by reintroducing market intervention measures 
and allowing the retention of some coupled subsidies.  
The 2013 CAP reform episode again highlights many of the core themes that are 
present in the extensive literature on agricultural policy in the EU. Although in many 
respects path-dependent, reform is not impossible but takes place in a largely 
incremental fashion that can nonetheless produce considerable change over time. 
There remains a tension between a state-assisted and neo-liberal paradigm that 
can fluctuate between reform episodes, and policy actors working within 
institutional frameworks negotiate on the basis of preferences, which in the case of 
many member states continue to be favourable to agriculture.  
Essentially the decision rules and institutional structures around the CAP, plus the 
balance of forces between member states, still works as a barrier against radical 
policy change. Although some governments such as the UK continue to advocate 
fundamental change, these remain largely voices in the wilderness. Most member 
states support the retention of the familiar CAP and its main policy instruments and 
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mechanisms. This preference has been buttressed, at least in the medium term, by 
the inclusion of the EP in the formal procedures of CAP reform. Exploiting its 
enhanced role in the decision-making process, the EP – so far at least – has 
worked to support the status quo on the CAP rather than facilitate radical change.  
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